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Abstract 
Studies show that people are concerned with other people’s consumption position in 
a varying degree with respect to the type of goods consumed and individual 
characteristics. Using both survey experiments and a large survey of subjective well-
being (SWB) dataset, this paper presents robust associations between the degree of 
empathic capacity and positional concerns for consumption items involving pleasure 
and pain. The paper exploits both empathy quotient (EQ) and interpersonal 
reactivity index (IRI) measures of empathic capacity, i.e., dispositional empathy, 
which are sufficient measures capturing affective and cognitive aspects of empathy. 
Positional concerns are identified directly using a series of stated choice experiments 
and indirectly using the SWB approach. The main result of the paper is that 
positional concerns vary substantially with the levels of empathic capacity. Both EQ 
and IRI are found to be positively associated with positional concerns for “goods” 
(e.g., after-tax income, market value of a luxury car), reflecting a degree of self-
regarded feelings and behavior to reduce personal distress, and negatively associated 
with positional concerns for “bads” (e.g., working hours and poverty rates), reflecting 
a degree of other-regarding feelings and behavior. The results are robust with respect 
to various checks including statistical specifications, reference groups, and omitted 
variables (e.g., prosocial behavior and competitivity) that could bias the results. 
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 “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,  
we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected,  
but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.”  
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Empathy is one of the basic processes that make us connect with other people’s 
feelings, emotions, and experiences (Batson, 1987; 1991; Eisenberg, 1994; Eisenberg 
and Miller, 1997; Brandstätter, 2000; Preston and de Waal, 2002; Keum and Shin, 
2016). It is most often considered to be the capacity or skill of “projecting yourself 
into what you observe” (Davis, 1980; Batson, 1991; de Waal, 2008; 2012). In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith extensively discussed the 
importance of empathy1 – as quoted above – in particular how it is associated with 
the other-regarding and self-interested behaviors in human life. Indeed, studies in 
fields ranging from neurobiology to psychology have already accumulated a bulk of 
evidence that empathy has evolved to predict other people’s behavior, feelings, and 
experiences of pleasure and pain (e.g., Batson, 1991; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 
2004; Coronin, 2012; Singer et al., 2006; de Waal, 2008; Klimecki et al., 2016).2 Thus, 
it is not surprising that behavioral economists give attention to how empathy is 
related to prosocial behavior including altruism, cooperation, and fairness 
considerations (e.g., Edele et al., 2013; Klimecki et al., 2016). How we emotionally 
 
1The term empathy was not yet available when Adam Smith discussed the relationship between 
“sympathy” and non-selfish behavior. He used the term sympathy almost synonymously to the current 
meaning of empathy. In recent literature, sympathy is considered an “affective” component of empathy 
(de Waal, 2008). See Fontaine (2001) and Sugden (2002) for historical accounts of the terms. 
2Different strands of literature from a wide variety of disciplines have investigated the evolutionary, 
neurobiological, and genetic roots of affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy (de Waal, 2008; 2012; 
Preckel et al., 2018). In studies involving humans and animals, neurobiologists identify mirror-neurons 
that operate during empathic processes (e.g., Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Fogassi, 2011; Khalil, 2011; 
Molnar-Szakacs, 2011; Coronin, 2012; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). 
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connect with and react to other people’s feelings, emotions, experiences of pleasure 
and pain might also be one of the building blocks of processes of social comparisons 
(“positional” or “status” concerns) with others (Tesser et al., 1988; Tesser, 1991; 
Brandstätter, 2000). The present paper investigates how people’s degree of empathic 
capacity relates to their positional concerns with respect to consumption goods 
associated with experiences of pleasure and pain. 
 
Positional concerns have long been discussed by various scholars including Adam 
Smith, Karl Marx, and Veblen, and the topic is currently attracting substantial 
empirical interest among social psychologists and economists (Senik, 2004; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 2008; Akay et al., 2013). These concerns imply that 
individuals’ utility is related not only to their own absolute level of consumption but 
also to their level of consumption relative to that of relevant others, i.e., their 
reference or comparison groups (Clark and Senik, 2010). One consequence of these 
comparisons is the negative externality causing personal distress and large welfare 
loss (Clark et al., 2008). The literature has identified important impacts of these 
externalities on economic issues ranging from labor supply and migration to optimal 
taxation (e.g., Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; Akay et al., 2017; Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenmann, 2014). However, little is known about the fundamental 
processes underlying positional behavior. Recently, another strand in the literature 
has focused on how positional concerns relate to contextual factors, individual socio-
demographic characteristics, and trait-like constructs including emotions, personality 
characteristics, and empathy (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990; Tesser, 1991; VanderZee et 
al., 1996; Brandstätter, 2000; White et al., 2006; Akay and Martinsson, 2011; Cuesta 
and Budria, 2015; Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2018). Drawing on this literature, 
to best of our knowledge first time, this study takes a comprehensive approach to 
investigate the relationship between the levels of “dispositional” or “trait” empathy 
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and positional concerns. To this end, we use both a series of tailor-made survey 
experiments (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Carlsson et al., 2007) dealing with 
an array of goods and the subjective well-being (SWB) approach that is based on a 
large survey of SWB and empathy-related information (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; 
Akay and Martinsson, 2011). 
 
Researchers seem to agree that empathy operates as an affective (“empathic 
emotions”) and cognitive (“perspective taking”) reflection process that helps the 
person connect to other people’s feelings and experiences (Batson, 1991; Tesser, 
1991). The empathic reflection process is also expected to operate when people 
compare their levels of consumption with those of other people (Tesser, et al., 1988; 
Tesser, 1991; Brandstätter, 2000; Batson et al., 2002; de Waal, 2008; 2012). This 
process may function as a source of information about the experience of others and 
might lead to substantial heterogeneity in the degree of positional concerns, which 
might also differ by the type of good under consideration, e.g., whether it is “a luxury 
car” or “poverty experience” (Tesser et al., 1988; Brandstätter, 2000). An increase 
in the consumption level of a “good3” – a consumption item that is associated with 
pleasure or utility – by an “average” relevant other person in an individual’s reference 
group is expected to increase the personal distress and reduce the individual’s well-
being (Clark et al., 2008). Yet someone with higher empathic capacity might become 
more distressed than other people as this person identifies the pleasure experience of 
others better. This person may try to selfishly seek a better consumption position to 
get a similar pleasant experience. Thus, we predict that a higher level of empathy 
might trigger a higher degree of self-regarding behavior and competition for a better 
 
3The term good should be clarified. We use it to mean any tangible or intangible commodity. To 
differentiate between goods associated with pleasure/utility and pain/disutility, we use the terms “goods” 
and “bads” (always in quotation marks), respectively. 
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consumption position for a “good” (Zillmann and Cantor, 1977; Batson, 1987; 
Lanzetta and Englis, 1989; Batson et al., 1991; de Waal, 2008; Coronin, 2012). Yet, 
the empathic reflection process regarding other people’s level of consumption of a 
“bad” – a consumption item associated with pain or disutility – might lead to 
completely different feelings and reactions. In this case, empathic reflection on the 
feelings and experiences of others might trigger “compassion” or “pity.” Thus, a 
person with higher empathic capacity is expected to act altruistically by competing 
less for a better position in the case of consumption items signaling suffering of others 
(Batson et al., 1991; de Waal, 2008). Thus, we expect that greater empathic capacity 
is negatively related to positional concerns about items involving pain or disutility. 
 
To investigate the associations between the levels of empathic capacity and 
positional concerns, we use two approaches that are often used to identify positional 
concerns. The first approach is based on a stated choice experiment with a 
hypothetical scenario where respondents make a series of decisions about the 
consumption levels of their “future relative” compared to “strangers” living in the 
same society or country, i.e., their reference group (Carlsson et al., 2007). The survey 
experiments identify the heterogeneity in positional concerns directly on individual 
utilities for a series of consumption items and elicit the long-form of empathy 
quotient (EQ) to capture the degree of empathic capacity (e.g., Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004; Edele et al., 2013). The second approach is based on SWB 
information in which the degree of positional concern is indirectly identified using 
the absolute and relative level of consumption of individuals (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005; Luttmer, 2005). The SWB dataset used is obtained from the General Social 
Survey (GSS), which is high-quality representative cross-sectional data (Einolf, 
2008). In this approach, the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) by Davis (1980; 
1983) is used as a measure of empathy. It is obtained from the National Altruism 
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Study Module supplied as a part of GSS for the years 2002 and 2004. Our extensive 
investigation shows that two alternative approaches with two measures of empathy 
produce strikingly similar results. Highly in line with the expectations, both the EQ 
and IRI measure of empathy are positively related with the degree of positional 
concerns for “goods” implying self-regarded feelings and behavior and negatively 
related with the degree of positional concerns for “bads” implying other-regarded 
feelings and behavior. We find that these results are highly robust with respect to 
control variables, functional form, reference groups, estimators, and proxies for the 
potential omitted variables (e.g., prosocial behavior, competitivity, envy, and self-
esteem).  
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes our 
survey experiment, i.e., the setup, descriptive and conditional results, and a detailed 
robustness analysis. Section 3 gives the evidence from the SWB approach, where we 
present the dataset, econometric specifications, results, and robustness analysis. 
Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Evidence from Survey Experiments 
 
2.1. Setup 
 
Procedure. The survey experiment consisted of two parts.4 First, our experiment 
assistants presented a script with a scenario and a set of hypothetical binary choice 
 
4According to the Turkish law, the experiment did not require an ethical committee approval and also 
there was no institutional review board for the social sciences in the Istanbul University by the time of 
our experiment, 2014. A written consent was not obtained from participants. Students voluntarily 
registered for the experiment and consents of the participants was implied through survey completion.  
 
    
 7 
questions to 307 randomly recruited respondents.5 They were asked to imagine “a 
future relative,” for example a grandchild who is going to live two generations from 
now. The choice situations in the survey experiment involved a series of decisions 
about the best society/country for the imaginary grandchild to live in. In the second 
part of the survey experiment, the respondents completed a questionnaire aimed to 
elicit i) socio-demographic and -economic characteristics, ii) psychological measures 
including empathy measures obtained using 60 questions of the EQ, personality 
characteristics (Big-5), self-esteem, and emotions, and iii) attitudes to prosocial 
behavior, competitivity, and inequality. That is, the respondents first made 
experimental decisions and then answered a series of neutral questions including 
questions about socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, university 
department, and family characteristics. Finally, the EQ questionnaire was 
distributed. To control for a possible trend (due to, e.g., fatigue, conformity, or 
alienation) across the repeated answers by the respondents, the decisions were 
arranged in six different orders of goods. Our empirical model specifications are also 
controlled for the order of questionnaire dummies to allow this sort of confounders. 
 
Utilities. In the first part of our survey experiment, the respondents were asked to 
decide which society, Society (A) or (B), they would like their imaginary grandchild 
to live in. Both societies consist of “strangers” and differ only in terms of the 
grandchild’s absolute and relative amount of consumption. The experimental 
 
5The respondents were recruited from three departments, economics, psychology, and law, of Istanbul 
University, Turkey. We announced the experiment with a poster on the boards of the student hall of 
each department. The experiment was conducted among the voluntary participants in three sessions in 
a large lecture hall. At the beginning of the experiment, the students were also told to feel free to leave 
the experiment anytime. The respondents were guided by five experimental assistants who presented the 
scenario of the experiment and answered any questions asked by the respondents. The experimental 
sessions lasted about an hour and the respondents were given a supplementary textbook that was priced 
about the average hourly wage in Istanbul at the time of the experiment in 2014. 
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assistants carefully described the hypothetical scenario and the example choice 
situation (see Appendix A). To measure individual-specific positional concerns for a 
good 𝑔, we begin with a utility function 𝑈#(𝑌#, 𝑌# − 𝑌#()	involving absolute level of 
consumption 𝑌# and relative level of consumption 𝑌# − 𝑌#( of good 𝑔. The functional 
form of the utility function is chosen to be linear for simplicity:  
 𝑈#(𝑌#, 𝑌# − 𝑌#() 	= (1 − 𝜆#)𝑌# + 𝜆#(𝑌# − 𝑌#().                                                       (1)                                                                                       
 
In (1), 𝜆#	is the parameter capturing the degree of positional concerns with respect 
to good 𝑔. 𝜆# can be interpreted as the fraction of marginal utility due to an increase 
in relative consumption of good 𝑔. Thus, a higher level of 𝜆# implies that individuals 
show a higher level of positional concern with respect to good 𝑔. The main aim of 
the experiment was to identify the mean degree of positional concerns (MDPC 
hereafter) for each good 𝑔. We used relatively large reference groups 𝑅, which 
consisted of “strangers” in a society or country. The design aims to exclude potential 
confounding emotions stemming from the socio-cultural and genetic proximity 
between individuals and the people in their reference groups (see, e.g., Tesser et al., 
1988 and Brandstätter, 2000 for discussions on the empathic reflection process in 
relation to liked and disliked particular others).  
 
Having specified the utility function for the whole population, we generate a series 
of binary choice situations with different combinations of absolute and relative levels 
of consumption for the future grandchild and other people in each society/country. 
Appendix A presents the outlines of the hypothetical scenario and the example choice 
situation for after-tax income/month. The income levels were chosen so that they 
implicitly involve a degree of positional concern once Society (B) is chosen. Imagine 
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that the respondent is indifferent between choosing Society (A) and Society (B). 
Then we can write  
 (1 − 𝜆#)𝑌0# + 𝜆#1𝑌0# − 𝑌0#(2 = (1 − 𝜆#)𝑌3# + 𝜆#1𝑌3# − 𝑌3#(2,                                      (2) 
 
and implementing the income levels given in Appendix A, we obtain 
 𝜆# = 4567486456974869 = :,;;;7<,=;;:,>;;7<,>;; = .20.                                                                     (3)                        
 
This figure implies that the respondent’s degree of positional concern should be at 
least	.20 (	𝜆# > .20) once Society (B) is chosen. To find the marginal interval of a 
respondent’s degree of positional concerns, we ask repeated binary questions 
involving combinations of absolute and relative levels of consumption corresponding 
to an increasing set of implicit degree of positionality as .25, .50, and .75 (see 
Appendix B.1 for three binary choice situations in case of the after-tax 
income/month experiment). That is, the experiment identifies the “marginal” 
interval of positionality by identifying the question at which the respondent switches 
from choosing Society (B) to Society (A) for each individual and good 𝑔. We 
experiment with several goods that differ in terms of the feeling and attitudes they 
are expected to trigger. The list of goods, choice situations, absolute and relative 
consumption levels, and corresponding implicit degrees of positional concerns are 
presented in Appendix B.2. 
 
2.2. Measuring Empathy 
 
Several strategies to measure empathy are suggested in the literature (e.g., Davis, 
1980; 1983; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004, Gerdes et al., 2010; Neumann et 
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al., 2015). Our measure of empathy is the empathy quotient (EQ), which is based 
on a set of survey items (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004). EQ is found to be a 
sufficient measure to identify both affective and cognitive dimensions of dispositional 
empathy (Lawrence et al., 2004; Edele et al., 2013). The measure mainly identifies 
the “trait” or “skill” dimension of empathy, with a higher level implying a higher 
level of dispositional empathic capacity (see Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 
for a detailed account of the measure).  
 
EQ is based on 60 survey items (see Appendix C.1 for the full set of 
expressions/statements). Yet, only 40 items are actually used to construct the scale; 
the only purpose of the rest of the items is to distract attention and prevent answers 
that trigger social desirability and individual alienation. The EQ scale is generated 
as follows: Each statement/expression in the inventory is responded to on a four-
point scale, i.e., “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.” There 
are two groups of items. In the first group (numbered 1, 6, 19, 22, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 
38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, and 60 in Appendix C.1), respondents score 
2 empathy points if they choose “strongly agree” and 1 point of empathy if they 
choose “agree.” In the second group (numbered 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 
30, 31, 33, 40, 45, 47, 51, 53, and 56 in Appendix C.1), respondents score 2 empathy 
points if they choose “strongly disagree” and 1 point if they choose “disagree.” The 
rest of the questions are scored as 0 as they merely serve as controls (numbered 2, 
3, 5, 7, 9, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33, 40, 45, 47, 51, 53, and 56 in Appendix 
C.1). 
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In our experiment, we obtained 267 fully completed EQ questionnaires. Eliminating 
respondents with at least one missing answer and those with inconsistent answers6 
reduced the sample to 224 observations for after-tax income/month, 214 for the 
market value of a luxury car, 231 for weekly working hours and poverty rates (%) 
experiments. The distribution of EQ scores is highly symmetric with a mean 
(median) value of 47.8 (47) and a standard deviation of 11.01. The minimum EQ 
score is found to be 16 and the maximum 76. The distribution of EQ is highly similar 
to that of studies using EQ (see, e.g., Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004: Edele et 
al., 2013).  
 
2.3. Unconditional Results 
 
Overall MDPC. As the first step of our analysis, we present the share of positional 
respondents – unconditional estimates of MDPC – split by goods and choice 
situations in Column I of Table 1. Fifty-two percent of the respondents chose the 
positional alternative, Society (B), for after-tax income/month. Sixty-one percent of 
respondents are positional when the implicit degree of positional concerns is .25, 
while the proportion decreases to 52% and 43% as the implicit degree is increased to 
.50 and .75 in the subsequent choice situations. The percentage of positional 
respondents is 56% for the market value of a luxury car, which is slightly higher than 
that for after-tax income/month. Yet the difference in shares of positional choice 
across these two goods is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The next 
two items are working hours/week and poverty rates (%). Only 39% percent of the 
 
6Some respondents make choices that are inconsistent with the utility maximization assumption. That is, 
the utility maximization assumption predicts that once a respondent chooses Society (A), she should not 
choose the positional alternative Society (B) for a larger implicit degree of positional concerns. We 
identified these respondents and simply removed them from the sample used in our analysis below. The 
share of inconsistent respondents is about 10–15% across the goods. 
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respondents chose the positional alternative for working hours/week. The share of 
positional choices is significantly smaller than that for after-tax income/month 
(Mann-Whitney-U test p-value < .001). The share of positional choice is 45% for the 
poverty rates (%). The positional behavior regarding poverty rates (%) is also lower 
than that for after-tax income/month and the market value of a luxury car (Mann-
Whitney-U test p-value=.043 for after-tax income/month and p-value=.002 for the 
market value of a luxury car). Overall, the unconditional MDPC estimates are about 
.39–.56, which are highly similar to the values in previous studies that used a similar 
sample and experimental design (cf. Akay et al., 2013) and in samples from other 
countries (cf. Carlsson, 2007). 
 
Heterogeneity in MDPC by EQ. The remaining columns of Table 1 present the 
descriptive results of our survey experiment for the different levels of EQ. Columns 
II and III show the share of positional choice for each good and choice situation split 
by low and high EQ levels. We identify individuals with a higher and lower level of 
empathic capacity using the median level of EQ = 47 as threshold. The unconditional 
MDPC is higher among people with a higher empathic capacity for after-tax 
income/month and the market value of a luxury car, i.e., “goods.” The share of 
positional choice is statistically different among people with lower and higher EQ for 
both after-tax income/month and the market value of a luxury car. The Mann-
Whitney-U test p-values are presented in the final column of Table 1 (Column IV). 
In most cases, the p-values suggest significant differences at conventional levels. 
 
The next two items involve individual pain or disutility, i.e., “bads.” While people 
who work longer hours earn more and might obtain a better income position, they 
also suffer as working longer hours involves disutility (Knabe and Rätzel, 2010). The 
unconditional results suggest that a higher EQ level relates to a lower share of 
    
 13 
respondents with positional concern with respect to working hours/week. The 
difference in the share of respondents with positional preferences across the levels of 
EQ is statistically significant at the conventional levels, p-value = .013. Finally, we 
focus on the poverty rates (%), which is a public “bad” and expected to involve a 
high degree of suffering. Indeed, the poverty rate can be considered as an overall 
measure for the degree at which the people in the society suffer. In line with our 
predictions, the respondents with higher empathic capacity show a lower level of 
positional concern. The Mann-Whitney-U test suggests that the difference in share 
of positional choice across the EQ levels is highly significant with p-value = 0.012. 
Table 1. Unconditional Results
Low Dispositonal 
Empathy 
(EQ<Median)
High Dispositional  
Empathy 
(EQ>Median)
I II III IV
After Tax Income/Month (in TRY) 0.521 0.446 0.578 0.004
Society A
Society B(1) 0.612 0.545 0.658 0.074
Society B(2) 0.520 0.446 0.575 0.046
Society B(3) 0.432 0.347 0.500 0.016
Market Value of a Car (in TRY) 0.558 0.511 0.582 0.069
Society A
Society B(1) 0.642 0.589 0.676 0.090
Society B(2) 0.576 0.522 0.604 0.222
Society B(3) 0.457 0.422 0.464 0.540
Working Hours (Week/Hours) 0.386 0.446 0.354 0.013
Society A
Society B(1) 0.501 0.565 0.471 0.077
Society B(2) 0.363 0.435 0.321 0.071
Society B(3) 0.295 0.337 0.269 0.130
Poverty Rates (%) 0.451 0.526 0.435 0.012
Society A
Society B(1) 0.555 0.603 0.504 0.058
Society B(2) 0.484 0.532 0.448 0.093
Society B(3) 0.399 0.444 0.352 0.068
TRY is the new Turkish Lira. EQ is the empathy quotient (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004)
Notes: Authors' wwn calculations from the experimental data. 
Share of Choosing  
Positional 
Alternative
 Share of Positional Choice among
Mann-Whitney-U 
Test (p-values) 
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Figure 1. The unconditional relationship between EQ and share of positional choice.  
 
  
  
 
Note: The figure displays unconditional relationship between the deciles of EQ (horizontal axis) and 
the unconditional MDPC (vertical axis). Panels (G.1–G.3) merge the income and car experiments, 
and panels (B.1–B.3) merge the working hours and poverty rates experiments. The relationship is 
presented for three choice situations with 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 implicit degrees of positional concerns. 
The lines represent the linear regression based on the underlying data. 
 
Detailed Results by Choice Situations. Figure 1 presents unconditional results 
to give further ideas about the relationship between the levels of empathic capacity 
and positional concerns. First, to obtain higher degrees of freedom, we merge the 
experimental data from the after-tax income/month and the market value of a luxury 
car experiments as “goods,” and working hours/week and poverty rates (%) as 
“bads.” Figure 1 presents the relationship by splitting for the three choice situations 
for both “goods” and “bads.” Along the horizontal axis are the 10 deciles of the EQ 
distribution and on the vertical axis we present unconditional estimates of MDPC 
for each decile. We also show the linear regression line (using the underlying data – 
10 observations in this case) to illustrate the strength of the unconditional 
relationship between the level of empathic capacity and positional concerns. A clear 
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pattern emerges, i.e., the relationship is positive for the “goods” (G.1–G.3) and 
negative for the “bads” (B.1–B.3) for each choice situation. The strength of the 
relationship is similar across the choice situations, which change only with respect 
to the underlying implicit degree of positional concern (.25, 0.5, and 0.75).  
 
2.4. Econometric Analysis 
 
Model Specification. To identify the association between EQ and positional 
concerns conditional on a set of individual characteristics, we estimate a series of 
interval regressions as we measure positionality in an interval for each individual 
and good. The estimation model reads: 
 𝜃DE# = 𝑿G𝛽 + 𝛼𝐸𝑄E + 𝑷G𝜙+𝜖E#,                                                                      (4) 
 
where 𝜃DE#	is the latent marginal positionality interval with upper 𝜃DE#(OPQRS) and 𝜃DE#(TUURS) boundaries for each individual 𝑖 and good 𝑔. The interval regression in 
model (4) allows for a set of observed characteristics, 𝑿, including age, gender, 
household income (in seven category dummies), household size, number of siblings, 
health status (four dummies from “very poor” health to “very good” health), 
department of the university (dummies for economics, psychology, and law), and six 
order-effect dummies. 𝛽 is the corresponding vector of parameters. The key variable 
in this study is our empathy measure EQ and the parameter of interest is 𝛼. The 
baseline model specification is based on the logarithm of EQ, which allows a degree 
of flexibility in the relationship between EQ and positional concerns. In our 
robustness checks, we also estimate models with alternative functional forms 
including the standardized levels of EQ and a dummy variable indicating high 
empathic capacity. The model specification (4) is estimated using the maximum 
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likelihood estimator, which assumes the normal distribution for the good-specific 
error terms 𝜖E#.  
 
Stochastic Specifications. The experimental setup in this study does not allow us 
to make causal interpretations of the relationship between EQ and positional 
concerns. That is, the results should be interpreted as correlations. Clearly, EQ might 
be correlated with the good-specific error terms 𝜖E#. Equation (4) might have omitted 
variables or positional concerns might determine people’s empathy level, e.g., reverse 
causality. In both cases, our results might be substantially biased. In this paper, we 
assume that dispositional empathy is a trait exogenously given to individuals. 
Therefore, the variation in the levels of empathy is assumed to be temporal due to 
contextual factors. Nevertheless, there might still be some variables that are 
persistently correlated with both the level of empathy and positional concerns, 
leading to omitted variables bias.   
 
Our approach to alleviate the omitted variables bias is to allow our model 
specifications for some proxies that are potentially correlated with EQ and error 
terms 𝜖E#. We suggest three important proxies that could capture potential omitted 
factors. The first is overall well-being, measured using life satisfaction – a measure of 
SWB. Respondents with higher life satisfaction may engage more in social life and 
helping behavior and experience less positional concern (Diener and Larsen, 2008; 
see also Dolan et al., 2008 for a general review of the determinants of SWB). Second, 
we allow our regressions for a measure of inequality aversion, which might be one of 
the factors underlying non-positional behavior and may correlate with EQ (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999).7 The third set of proxies involves personality characteristics 
 
7 To measure the degree of inequality aversion, we elicit subjective attitudes to inequality using the 
questions as follows. Using a 1–7 scale, the participants reported their preference regarding two sets of 
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measured using the so-called five factor model (Big-5, extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness-to-experience).8 These characteristics 
are considered to measure non-cognitive skills, e.g., memory, social skills, and 
motivation, and have been found to be hard-wired constructs as they are stable after 
adolescence (McCrae and John, 1992; Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013). We then 
include these proxies in matrix 𝑷, and 𝜙 is the vector of corresponding parameters. 
In our robustness analysis, we will include several other proxies, e.g., prosocial 
behavior and competitivity as well as emotions (e.g., envy) and self-esteem, to tease 
out potential variables driving the relationship. 
 
2.5. Conditional Results 
 
Baseline. Our baseline model specification is an interval regression as presented in 
equation (4). The maximum likelihood estimation of the model specification is 
summarized in Figure 2.9 The full estimation results are not presented as the focus 
of our paper is on the relationship between EQ and positional concerns.10 We are 
mainly interested in the sign, significance, and relative magnitude of EQ on positional 
concerns across goods. Conditional on the full set of socio-demographic and                  
-economic variables (see the note in Figure 2), overall well-being, inequality aversion, 
 
statements, i.e., (A) “income should be more equal as incentives” (1) vs. “we need larger income differences 
for higher effort” (7) and (B) “an egalitarian society where the gap between rich and poor is small, 
regardless of achievement” (1) vs. “a society, where wealth is distributed according to ones’ achievement” 
(7). Then we obtained the measure of subjective inequality aversion by simply adding the two scores 
reported for (A) and (B). 
8The Big-5 is measured based on 15 questions obtained from the 2009 questionnaire of the German Socio-
Economic Panel. See www.diw.de for further information.  
9One important remark is that, in our baseline model specification, the first (last) boundaries of the 
marginal positionality intervals are assumed to be censored below (above). We also estimate models by 
assuming 0 and 1 for the censored boundaries. The results are practically the same.  
10The full estimation results are not presented due to space reasons, but can be provided by the authors 
upon request.  
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and Big-5 personality traits, the logarithm of EQ is positively and significantly 
associated (p-value=.031) with positional concerns regarding after-tax 
income/month. The parameter estimate of EQ on positional concerns regarding the 
market value of a luxury car is also positive, but the magnitude of it is lower than 
that of after-tax income/month and it is not estimated with lower precision (p-
value=.122). The positive parameter estimates of EQ on positional concerns for 
“goods” are highly in line with our predictions. In the third bar of the first group of 
goods (pleasure and utility), we present results by combining the experimental data 
from the after-tax income/month and the market value of luxury car experiments. 
The parameter estimate of EQ is positive and statistically significant on positional 
concerns (p-value=.017).  
 
Figure 2. Baseline Results: Interval Regressions 
 
Note: The bars present parameter estimates of log EQ on positional concerns obtained from the 
baseline model specification (4). The dependent variable is the marginal positionality interval for each 
respondent. The interval regressions control for the full set of control variables: age, gender, household 
income after tax (in seven income categories), a dummy indicating whether the respondent lives with 
parents, university department (economics, psychology, or law), household size, overall well-being 
(five dummies), inequality aversion, Big-5 personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness-to-experience). Robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses under the parameter estimates. P-values (p) are presented inside the bars.  
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We now turn our attention to consumption items that involve pain or disutility. 
First, we estimate the baseline specification (4) for positional concerns regarding 
working hours/week. The parameter estimate of EQ is negative and statistically 
significant at conventional levels, p-value=.051. That is, a higher level of empathic 
capacity is associated with a lower level of positional concern regarding longer 
working hours/week. Second, we estimate the baseline model specification with the 
data from the poverty rates (%) experiment. In line with the predictions, the 
parameter estimate of EQ is negative, large in magnitude, and highly statistically 
significant, p-value<.01. The final bar combines these two items into one data set. 
Overall, a higher level of empathy is associated with a lower level of positional 
concerns with respect to “bads.”  
 
Heterogeneity. On average, the baseline results suggest a significant association 
between empathic capacity and positional concerns, yet the sign and magnitude of 
the association differ across goods. An important direction of analysis is to predict 
the MDPC across the levels of EQ conditional on the full set of individual 
characteristics. To this end, the estimated baseline interval regression is exploited to 
predict conditional MDPC for specific levels of EQ. MDPC is calculated for a more 
flexible functional form of EQ by adding the quadratic term in the baseline. 
Prediction is obtained by holding all control variables fixed at their mean values 
except EQ. Then, the MDPC and standard errors of predictions are calculated using 
several values of EQ from 20 to 80 in 5-point steps. Confidence intervals based on 
normal distribution are calculated to identify whether the degree of heterogeneity in 
MCPC is statistically significant across the levels of EQ. 
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The predicted conditional MDPC is given in the panels of Figure 3. Panel (A) 
presents the pattern of MDPC (horizontal axis) across the levels of EQ (vertical 
axis) for after-tax income/month and the market value of a luxury car, while Panel 
(B) illustrates the pattern for the working hours/week and poverty rates (%) 
experiments. As can be seen, the conditional MDPC is highly heterogeneous for 
alternative levels of EQ both for “goods” and “bads.” Comparing confidence intervals 
across the levels of EQ unveils that MDPC for EQ levels from 45 to 65 are 
statistically significantly different from those MDPC for EQ levels below 40–45 for 
both “goods” (A) and “bads” (B). Among the unreported results, the standard errors 
obtained from the delta method are replaced with bootstrapped standard errors. The 
results hardly change. We also find a similar pattern in MDPC obtained from a non-
parametric estimator, i.e., Spearman-Karber, and therefore the results are not 
presented in here.  
 
Figure 3. Heterogeneity of Conditional MDPC by EQ Levels  
 
    
Note: The panels present predicted conditional MDPC (horizontal axis) from the baseline interval 
regression (4), which uses a quadratic function of empathy (EQ). The levels of EQ are given along 
the vertical axis. The dependent variable is the marginal positionality interval for each respondent. 
The interval regressions control for the full set of controls (see Figure 2). Panel (A) combines data 
for the after-tax income/month and market value of car experiments while Panel (B) combines data 
from working hours/week and poverty rates (%) experiments. The horizontal lines represent 90% 
confidence intervals.  
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2.6. Robustness 
 
Functional Form. First, we investigate the sensitivity of the baseline results 
(Figure 2) with respect to the functional form of EQ. The parameter estimates of 
the baseline model with the dummy indicating individuals with high EQ scores are 
presented in Row II of Table 2. The dummy for high EQ level is constructed by 
assigning a value of 1 for above-median EQ levels, EQ > 47, and zero for other levels. 
The signs and significance of the estimates are highly in line with those of the 
baseline. Next, we estimate a model with standardized values of EQ. In this 
specification, EQ enters the baseline specification (4) linearly and leads to highly 
similar results (Row III). 
 
Estimators. The model specification in equation (4) is also estimated with 
alternative estimators. First is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, where the 
dependent variable is redefined as the midpoints, e.g., (0 + 0.25)/2 for the first 
interval and so on, of each marginal positionality interval. The parameter estimates 
presented in Row IV are highly similar to those from the baseline specification (Row 
I). However, unlike the baseline interval regressions, OLS produces statistically 
significant estimates for all goods and their combinations. Second, the dependent 
variable is redefined as a dummy variable indicating the positional choice (Society 
B) in any choice situation for each good. The model specification is then a binary 
choice model and is estimated with the probit model. The results presented in Row 
V indicate highly similar with more precise parameter estimates.11 Third, an ordered 
probit model is estimated by assigning ordinal values for the marginal positionality 
 
11We present the parameter estimates instead of marginal effects as we are mainly interested in comparing 
the signs and significance of these estimators with those of the baseline. The marginal effects can be 
reported upon request.  
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intervals as 𝜃DE# = 0, 1, 2, 3 for each individual 𝑖 and good 𝑔. This model specification 
is only slightly different from the baseline interval regression. It assumes that the 
cut-off points for the marginal positionality intervals are unknown constants and 
they are simultaneously estimated within the same estimation process. The 
parameter estimates are presented in Row VI. They are all statistically significant 
and have the same signs and significance levels of those found in the baseline (Row 
I) 
 
 
I. Log EQ 0.205 ** 0.150    0.178 ** -0.181 *  -0.288 *** -0.226 ***
(0.097)    (0.097)    (0.071)    (0.094)    (0.082)    (0.065)    
#Observations 224    214    438    231    231    462    
II. High EQ Dummy 0.129 *** 0.070    0.102 *** -0.074 *  -0.093 ** -0.081 ** 
(0.046)    (0.045)    (0.033)    (0.042)    (0.046)    (0.032)    
III. Linear (standardized) EQ 0.050 ** 0.031    0.041 ** -0.043 *  -0.068 *** -0.054 ***
(0.024)    (0.024)    (0.018)    (0.024)    (0.021)    (0.017)    
IV. Linear Model with OLS 0.228 ** 0.178 * 0.202 *** -0.186 * -0.272 *** -0.197 ***
(0.107)    (0.106)    (0.074)    (0.108)    (0.091)    (0.072)    
V. Probit 0.814 *** 0.659 ** 0.725 *** -0.809 *** -1.250 *** -0.909 ***
(0.240)    (0.259)    (0.175)    (0.248)    (0.243)    (0.171)    
VI. Ordered Probit 0.740 *  0.753 *  0.707 ** -0.695 *  -1.221 *** -0.887 ***
(0.378)    (0.424)    (0.280)    (0.402)    (0.381)    (0.278)    
VII. Prosocial Behavior 0.195 ** 0.144    0.170 ** -0.186 ** -0.281 *** -0.222 ***
(0.096)    (0.097)    (0.071)    (0.094)    (0.083)    (0.066)    
VIII. Competitivity 0.209 ** 0.149    0.182 *** -0.182 *  -0.285 *** -0.225 ***
(0.095)    (0.096)    (0.070)    (0.094)    (0.082)    (0.065)    
672    642    1314    693    693    1386    #Observations
Note: Author's own calculations from the experimental data.
The models allow for the full set of control varibles (See Figure 2)
(A) combines the income and car experiments while (B) combines the working hours and poverty rates experiments.
Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
Model Specification
Baseline (Figure 2)
Functional Forms
Estimators
Further Proxies for Omitted Variables
I II III IV BA
Table 2. Robustnes: Functional Form, Estimators, and Omitted Variables
I and II
Pleasure and Utility
III and IV
Poverty Rate 
(% of People)
Income 
(TRY/Month)
Market Value 
of a Car          
(TRY)
Working Hours  
(Hours/Week)
Pain and Disutiliy
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Further Omitted Variables. To deal with bias due to endogeneity generated by 
omitted variables, we experiment with further proxies that might be correlated with 
EQ and error terms. Two key variables that we focus on are prosocial behavior (e.g., 
helping behavior, altruism or cooperation) and degree of competitivity. Recent 
literature identifies an important positive relationship between empathy and 
prosocial behavior, while there is an opposite relationship between empathy and 
competitivity (e.g., Klimecki et al., 2016). To identify the degree of prosocial 
behavior, we elicit a detailed measure for the helping or volunteering behavior of 
respondents, which might also be a measure of their degree of altruistic behavior. 
The respondents were asked whether they had taken part in any volunteer activities 
in the past year (see Appendix C.2 for the full set of volunteer activities). The 
measure is created by simply summing up the binary responses to all volunteering 
items. Implementing the measure in our baseline interval regression hardly changes 
any estimation results (Row VII of Table 2).  
 
Then, we elicited a proxy for the degree of competitivity using three questions (see 
Appendix C.3 for the full set of questions). The questions aim to elicit the desire of 
respondents living in “egalitarian-competitive,” “welfare state-individualistic,” and 
“regulated-deregulated societies.” Each question is responded from 1 to 5 as 1 “closer 
to first,” 2 “somewhat closer to first,” 3 “can’t say which,” 4 “somewhat closer to 
second,” and 5 “closer to second.” To determine the proxy for the degree of 
competitiveness, we sum the answers to the three questions. The proxy is then 
controlled for in the baseline regression and the results are presented in Row VIII of 
Table 2. The parameter estimates are highly similar to those obtained from the 
baseline.12 
 
12Among the unreported results, we also allow our regressions for “dispositional envy” and “self-esteem” in 
separate regressions. Envy is often considered an emotion underlying positional behavior. To measure envy, 
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3. Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data 
 
Another approach to investigate positional concern is based on SWB regressions 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Senik, 2005, Luttmer, 2005; Clark et al., 2008; Akay and 
Martinsson, 2011). In these regressions, SWB, e.g., life satisfaction or happiness, is 
used as a proxy for (experienced) utility (Kahneman and Sugden, 2006).13 Then SWB 
regressions are estimated on own level of consumption of a good and on a reference 
(or comparison) level of consumption by others, i.e., a reference group. The literature 
aiming to identify positional concerns using SWB datasets has grown rapidly in 
recent years (e.g., see Clark et al., 2008 for a comprehensive review). The literature 
reports that SWB is negatively affected by income comparisons in developed 
countries (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005), but positively affected or not 
significantly affected in transition (Senik, 2004) and developing countries (Akay and 
Martinsson, 2011). In this section, we present complementary evidence based on a 
large survey that includes data on, e.g., SWB, degree of empathic capacity, absolute 
and reference per capita after-tax income/month, and working hours/week. 
 
 
 
we use the Dispositional Envy Scale developed by Smith et al. (1999). Introducing dispositional envy only 
slightly increases the magnitude of estimates for the “goods,” while there is practically no effect on the 
parameter estimates for “bads.” Finally, we use the Rosenberg (1985) inventory for “self-esteem.” The 
literature suggests that self-esteem is related to both empathy and positional behavior for several goods 
including physical appearance or career success (e.g., Vrabel et al., 2018). Adding the self-esteem measure 
in the baseline slightly increased the estimates. Importantly, in the specification with self-esteem, the EQ 
on positional concern is statistically significant for all consumption items including the market value of a 
luxury car. 
13Several studies have validated SWB measures as a measure of well-being (Krueger and Schkade, 2008). 
Today there is a consensus that these simple subjective questions can indeed capture levels of individual 
welfare (e.g., Oswald and Wu, 2010). 
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3.1. Data 
 
The dataset at use is the General Social Survey (GSS), which is a large and nationally 
representative cross-sectional dataset collected since 1978.14 It is very rich with 
respect to socio-demographic and -economic characteristics and includes a wealth of 
subjective opinion questions, e.g., attitudes to empathy and a large list of proxies for 
prosocial behavior. Our sample selection is straightforward. In our analysis, we use 
people older than 17 and younger than 75 years of age. The empathy information is 
available in the 2002 and 2004 waves in the National Altruism Study Module which 
is a part of the GSS dataset. Having deleted the missing values in all variables used 
in our analysis leaves a sample size of 2,237 individuals. The SWB measure is based 
on “happiness” information about individuals obtained by means of the following 
question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – would you 
say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” The variable is 
observed on 3-point ordinal scale that aims to capture the respondent’s subjective 
welfare experience. In our SWB regressions, we allow for a large set of individual 
socio-demographic and -economic characteristics that are often used in well-being 
regressions (see, e.g., Dolan et al., 2008 for a comprehensive review).  
 
3.2. Measures 
 
Measure of Empathy. The dataset allows us to calculate Davis’ (1980; 1983) 
interpersonal reactivity index (IRI). This measure is based on responses to seven 
expressions/statements, e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
 
14The data are collected by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. The 
dataset is obtained from http://gss.norc.org/get-the-data. Please visit the website for further information 
on the sampling frame and measures.  
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fortunate than me” and “I am often quite touched by things that I see happen” (see 
Appendix D.1 for the full set of statements) on a 5-point scale, where 1=“completely 
disagree” and 5=“completely agree” for items (1), (3), (6), and (7) and the opposite 
for items (2), (4), and (5). Then we simply calculate the average score for the seven 
items. In line with the EQ measure of empathy, a higher IRI indicates a higher 
degree of dispositional or trait empathy. The mean IRI is 3.94 (std. 1.24). 
 
Consumption Goods and Their Absolute and Relative Levels. To sustain 
comparability with the experimental results, we investigate two consumption items 
that are highly in line with those used in our experiments: per capita after-tax 
income/month as a “good” and working hour/week as a “bad.” After-tax income is 
the total after-tax family income from all sources in a year divided by 12. To obtain 
the per capita after-tax income/month, we use weights of the standard OECD 
equivalence scale (1 for the individual, 0.7 for each adult, and 0.5 for each child in 
the household). To obtain average weekly working hours, we use the average hours 
spent on the primary job for each individual. We simply use zero working hours for 
those who were unemployed in the previous survey year. 
 
To measure relative levels of per capita after-tax income/month and working 
hours/week, the reference groups with which individuals compare their income or 
working hours should be defined. As in the bulk of the SWB literature, our approach 
is based on defining reference groups using some criteria, e.g., age, gender, and region 
(e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005). Recent 
studies also show that defining reference groups with ad-hoc criteria and directly 
asking individuals about their reference group produce highly similar results (Clark 
and Senik, 2010). The reference groups that we use are based on age, gender, health 
status, marital status, and region of residence. We use combinations of these criteria 
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for each reference group used in our estimations. Our baseline reference group 
definition suggests that “the individuals compare their per capita after-tax household 
income (working hours/week) with the average per capita after-tax household income 
(working hours/week) of all people who live in the same region (nine regions), who 
are in the same age group (four quartiles of age distribution), and who are of the 
same gender (male or female).” The number of reference groups with this definition 
is 72, each consisting of about 30 individuals. We then use the average per capita 
after-tax family income/month or average working hours/week of the reference group 
as the reference income or reference working hours with which the individuals 
compare their own income or own hours of work. Next, we add marital status 
(married=1) and health status (very good health=1) in the definition to check the 
robustness of the results. 
 
3.3. Econometric Approach and Results 
 
Model Specification. To investigate how positional concerns are heterogeneous 
with respect to the degree of empathic capacity, we are going to estimate a series of 
well-being equations. SWB is measured on a 3-point ordinal scale and the appropriate 
model is an ordinal choice model. The baseline model specification, in which we 
estimate the absolute and reference consumption levels on SWB for a good, is as 
follows: 
 𝑆𝑊𝐵E∗ = 𝜆0 𝑙𝑛1𝑌E02 + 𝜆( 𝑙𝑛(𝑌S() + 𝑿G𝛽 + 𝑠_ + 𝜏a + 𝜖E.                                          (5)  
 
In equation (5), 𝑆𝑊𝐵E is the happiness measure and takes the values of 𝐽 = 1, 2, 3, 
and 𝑖 indicates the individual. 𝑌E0	is the own level of per capita after-tax income or 
own working hours/week. 𝑌S( is the reference level of per capita after-tax 
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income/month or working hours/week and is calculated as 𝑌S( = (1/𝑁S7<)∑ 𝑌f(ghijfk< , 
which is the “average” level of per capita after-tax income/month or working 
hours/week in individual 𝑖’s reference group 𝑟. 𝑁S is the number of people in the 
reference group.15 
 𝜆0 is the parameter of own consumption while 𝜆( is the parameter for the reference 
consumption, which is a measure of the positional concerns as it indicates the 
strength of the relationship between the consumption level of people in the reference 
group and individuals’ well-being. The sign of 𝜆0 is expected to be positive for after-
tax income/month as a higher level of resources implies a higher level of well-being. 
The literature suggests that time spent on working is associated with disutility, 
implying a negative relationship between own working hours and well-being (Knabe 
and Rätzel, 2010; Rätzel, 2012). Yet longer working hours also implies a higher level 
of resources, which might correlate positively with well-being. Thus, the sign of the 
relationship between own working hours on well-being is a priori unknown. 𝜆( is 
expected to be negative for per capita after-tax income/month and positive for 
working hours. While a higher level of income of others implies a lower income 
position, a higher level of working hours among others implies a higher level of 
indirect benefits for the individual.  
 
The main aim of this section is to investigate how 𝜆( varies with respect to the 
degree of empathic capacity, IRI. To this end, interaction models are used. 𝜆(	in the 
model specification (5) is replaced with 𝜆( 	= 𝜆(mn(n𝐷E + 𝜆(pn(n(1 − 𝐷E), where 𝐷E is a 
dummy variable indicating individuals with high IRI levels. We define high levels of 
 
15As in the bulk of the literature investigating positional concerns, we also use the parameter estimates of 
the reference income as a measure of the degree of positional concerns (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). 
Another strategy to identify positional concerns is to use the log	(Yuv/Ywx), which is practically the same as 
the specification in (5).  
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empathic capacity using the median IRI = 4 as threshold. The hypothesis we test is 
whether 𝜆(mn(n is equal to 𝜆(pn(n for per capita after-tax income/month and working 
hours/week in separate regressions. 
 
Specifications. The model specification allows for a large set of individual and 
household characteristics, 𝑿, including age, gender, health status (in four dummies 
from “very poor” to “very good”), years of education, marital status (dummies for 
married, single, widowed, and divorced), number of children at home (dummies for 
kids 1-5 years old, 6-11 years old, and 12-17 years old), total household size, race 
(dummies for white, black, and other), labor market status (dummies for working 
full-time, working part-time, temporarily not working, retired, and in school). 𝛽 is a 
vector of parameters corresponding to the control variables in matrix 𝑋. The model 
also allows for nine region16 dummies	𝑠_. The model specification pools data from two 
waves and 𝜏a is the dummy for the 2004 wave. 𝜖E is the usual error term.  
 
An appropriate model specification for equation (5) is an ordered probit, which 
exploits the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Yet, recent research shows 
that there is basically no difference between a linear model and ordered probit 
specification (Ferrier-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). To exploit the simplicity of 
linear models, we prefer ordinary least squares as our baseline model specification. 
However, we also estimate models with the ordered probit model specification and 
compare the results.  
 
 
 
16The dataset does not include information on the federal states where the individuals reside. Instead, we 
use a regional classification based on nine groups of federal states: New England, middle Atlantic, south 
Atlantic, east and west north central, east and west south central, mountain, and Pacific states 
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3.4. Results  
 
Main Results. We estimate the well-being regression in (5) with and without the 
interaction terms for two alternative goods, i.e., per capita after-tax income/month 
and working hours/week. The results are summarized in Table 4.17 First, we estimate 
the baseline model specification (5), where we allow only for absolute and reference 
income without interaction terms (Column I). In line with the expectations, the 
absolute level of income is positively related to happiness while the reference income 
is negatively associated. These results are also highly in line with the literature 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005). The significant relationship between 
reference income and happiness is an indicator of a degree of positional concern. Our 
main aim is to test whether the relationship between reference income and happiness 
is heterogeneous with respect to the degree of empathic capacity measured by IRI. 
The results from the baseline interaction model are given in Column II of Table 4. 
There is substantial heterogeneity in estimated reference income (Rows A and B). 
The reference income on SWB is negative and statistically significant only among 
high-IRI people. The difference between parameter estimates for low and high degree 
of empathic capacity is statistically significant at the conventional levels of 
significance (p-value=.068). That is, a higher level of empathic capacity is associated 
with a stronger negative effect of positional concerns regarding per capita after-tax 
income/month on happiness. This result is highly consistent with the results from 
our survey experiment above. 
 
 
17The full estimation results of the well-being regressions are not reported here due to space limitations. 
However, they are highly similar to those in the literature. Age and happiness have a U-shaped relationship 
while health and employment status are positively related to happiness. All estimation results are available 
upon request from the authors (See Dolan et al., 2008).  
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Next, we turn our attention to positional concerns regarding working hours/week 
and conduct a similar analysis as for per capita after-tax income/month. The results 
from the baseline model (5) without the interaction terms are presented in Column 
V of Table 4. The absolute working hour/week on SWB is statistically insignificant 
while the reference working hours/week on happiness is positive and statistically 
significant, which is also in line with the expectations. We estimate the baseline 
model with interaction terms and present the results in Column VI. The results are 
strikingly consistent with those from the survey experiment. A higher level of 
empathic capacity leads to a weaker and statistically insignificant relationship 
between reference working hours/week and SWB, implying a degree of other-
regarding feelings or behavior. The parameter estimate of reference working hours is 
large, positive, and statistically significant among people with a lower level of 
empathy. The difference between the parameter estimates of reference working 
hours/week by low and high empathy is also statistically significant (p-value=0.019). 
 
Robustness. We extensively investigate the robustness of the baseline results and 
summarize our findings in Table 4. Our robustness testing presented here mainly 
targets the definition of reference groups and potential omitted variables, which are 
the key threats to the estimation results. Two additional criteria are added in the 
baseline definition of the reference groups. First, a dummy for married individuals 
(married=1) is used together with age (four quartiles of the age distribution), gender, 
and regions (nine regions) in RG-1.18 The results from RG-1 are given in Columns 
III and VIII for per capita after-tax income/month and working hours/week, 
respectively. Adding marital status into the reference group definition does not 
 
18Note that the precision of reference income is highly related to the size of reference groups. Thus, adding 
more criteria substantially reduces both the sample size and the reference income and working hours 
estimates.   
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substantially affect the parameter estimates and test results. In RG-2 (Columns IV 
and IX), we add health status into the baseline definition of the reference group. The 
health status is defined using a dummy variable indicating individuals with “good” 
and “very good” health. The size of the reference income estimates with RG-2 is 
somehow reduced for the per-capita after-tax income/month. Yet the differences 
across the low and high levels of IRI are still statistically significant (p-value=0.041). 
The results for working hours/week are highly similar to those of the baseline 
(Column VI). 
 
Finally, we investigate the robustness with respect to potential omitted variables. 
As our dataset is cross-sectional, we are not able to allow for unobserved individual 
effects (e.g., typically considered to be personality dispositions or genetic factors). If 
these characteristics are correlated with IRI, the results presented in Table 4 might 
be biased. As in the case of our survey experiment, we control equation (5) for some 
proxy variables that may be correlated with EQ and error terms. The dataset 
includes a rich set of variables that can be used for this purpose. In line with the 
previous analysis, we mainly focus on the prosocial behavior measured using 
attitudes to altruism (e.g., volunteering and helping behavior). The measures are 
obtained using the set of 15 questions in the National Altruism Study Module of 
GSS dataset supplied for the years 2002 and 2004. The full set of questions in this 
module is given in Appendix D.2 (see also Einolf, 2008, for further discussions).  
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Our modeling strategy is to include these 15 proxies for altruistic attitudes and 
helping behavior in our baseline interaction model specification and check whether 
the previous results stay the same. These results are presented in Columns V and X 
of Table 4. Adding these variables have only a marginal influence on the parameter 
estimates and the test results. The differences in the parameter estimates of reference 
per capita after-tax income/month and working hour/week on SWB for low and high 
IRI are still statistically significant. Among the unreported results, we conducted 
several further sensitivity checks. First, we experimented by creating alternative 
proxies by summing or averaging all items in Appendix D.2. The results are 
practically the same. Second, we estimated our interaction models with an 
alternative set of control variables and estimators. We estimated the baseline 
interaction model using a stepwise estimation strategy and also with the ordered 
probit model specification. The results presented in Table 4 hardly changed. 
 
4. Concluding Discussions 
 
Empathic capacity measured using both the empathy quotient (Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004) and the interpersonal reactivity index (Davis, 1983) is 
significantly associated with positional concerns identified using survey experiments 
and the subjective well-being (SWB) approach. The experiments were conducted for 
an alternative set of goods associated with individual pleasure and suffering to 
investigate how people’s levels of empathy relate their positional concerns with 
regard to a number of consumption “goods” and “bads”. The SWB approach 
investigates how the utility impact of others’ consumption is heterogenous with 
respect to the level of empathic capacity. Our main conclusion is that positional 
concerns substantially vary with the levels of empathic capacity. The degree of 
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heterogeneity in positional concerns differ across types of goods in a predictable 
pattern. The results are very robust and suggest that people with a higher level of 
empathic capacity are more concerned about their relative consumption position (or 
their utility is affected more) when the object of their comparisons is a consumption 
item associated with pleasure and utility while they are less positional (or their utility 
is affected less) when it is a consumption item associated with pain and disutility. 
Extensive robustness analysis suggests that the results are insensitive with respect 
to functional forms, estimators, empathy measure used, and potential omitted 
variables (e.g., prosocial behavior) that may bias the results.  
 
Our results are highly intuitive and suggest that positional concerns vary with 
empathic capacity. One obvious implication of this finding is that the economic 
models aiming to relate optimal taxation, labor supply, and consumption decisions 
with positional concerns should also consider the heterogeneity in positional concerns 
due to dispositional empathy differences across individuals. However, caution should 
be taken. In conceptual terms, we rely on the definition of a trait-like empathy, i.e., 
dispositional empathic capacity. Thus, the results in this paper can be interpreted 
as part of a recently developing literature aiming to investigate how non-cognitive 
skills relate to economic outcomes of individuals (e.g., Borghans et al., 2010). 
However, empathy can also change temporally depending on contextual factors, and 
the utility implications of these temporal changes might depend on another set of 
factors, e.g., the speed of adaptation to temporal shocks. Our first suggestion for 
future research is to extend the research presented here to experiments where 
temporal empathy is measured (see, e.g., Klimecki et al., 2016). Another important 
issue that is not investigated in our study is the composition of individuals in the 
reference groups. As the psychology literature suggests, people’s empathic reflection 
process may differ depending on the socio-cultural or genetic proximity to the people 
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in their reference groups (Brandstätter, 2000). In our paper, we assumed that 
individuals’ reference groups are exogenously given and formed by “strangers.” Thus, 
our second suggestion for future research is to investigate how the characteristics of 
people in the reference group interfere with the relationship between empathy and 
positional concerns.  
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Appendix A. The Scenario and Example Choice Situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Appendix A. The Scenario and Example Choice Situation
In this part of the questionnaire we require you to choose which society you consider to be the best one for
an imaginary person living two generations into the future. You can, for example, imagine a grandchild,
great grandchild or another relative that you are choosing for. By ‘best’ we mean the society in which your
future relative will be most content.
·       The difference between the societies is the income level or the amount of consumption for a
certain good of your future relative, and the average income and consumption of the society.
·       The variety of goods and their prices are the same for both societies. For 100 TRY you can buy
the same goods and the same amount in both societies. Prices are expressed in today’s price level.
·       It is important that you focus your answer on what is in the best interest of the imagined
person, and nothing else. There is no “correct” response to these questions and we ask you to reflect on
the choices carefully.
Example : In the example below your future relative earns 200 TRY/month more in society A compared
with society B. You can also see that your future relative earns 500 TRY/month less than the average
income in society A and 300 TRY/month more than the average in society B.
        Society A:         – Your relative’s income is 2,000 TRY/month after tax
                                  – The average income in society is 2,500 TRY/month after tax
        Society B:         – Your relative’s income 1,800 TRY/month after tax
                                  – The average income in society is 1,500 TRY/month after tax
We require you to choose which society you consider to be the best one for your future relative; that is, the 
society in which your future relative will be most content. It is important that you focus your answer solely 
on this; that is: which society is the best for your future relative? You should not consider which society is 
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Appendix B.1. The Survey Experiment (After-Tax Income/Month) 
Income of your future relative (1) 
In the situation below, make a choice between society A and society B for your future relative. 
         Society A: – Your relative’s income is 2000 TRY/month after tax 
                                  – The average income in society is 2200 TRY/month after tax 
        Society B:      – Your relative’s income is 1800 TRY/month after tax 
                                 – The average income in society is 1400 TRY/month after tax 
Everything, including the price levels, are same in two societies. In both societies your relative works 40 
hours per week and this is equal to the average weekly work hours. Choose the society in which your 
future relative will be most content. 
Society A  Society B  
    
 
 
Income of your future relative (2) 
In the situation below, make a choice between society A and society B for your future relative. 
        Society A: – Your relative’s income is 2000 TRY/month after tax 
                                  – The average income in society is 2200 TRY/month after tax 
 
        Society B:      – Your relative’s income is 1550 TRY/month after tax 
                                 – The average income in society is 1300 TRY/month after tax 
 
Everything, including the price levels, are same in two societies. In both societies your relative works 40 
hours per week and this is equal to the average weekly work hours. Choose the society in which your 
future relative will be most content. 
Society A  Society B  
    
 
 
Income of your future relative (3) 
In the situation below, make a choice between society A and society B for your future relative. 
         Society A: – Your relative’s income is 2000 TRY/month after tax 
                                  – The average income in society is 2200 TRY/month after tax 
 
        Society B:      – Your relative’s income is 1220 TRY/month after tax 
                                 – The average income in society is 1160 TRY/month after tax 
 
Everything, including the price levels, are same in two societies. In both societies your relative works 40 
hours per week and this is equal to the average weekly work hours. Choose the society in which your 
future relative will be most content. 
Society A  Society B  
    
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Appendix B.2. The Summary of Survey Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I II III
After Tax Income/Month (TRY)
Society A 2,000 2,200
Society B(1) 1,800 1,400 0.250
Society B(2) 1,550 1,300 0.500
Society B(3) 1,220 1,160 0.750
Market Value of a Car (TRY)
Society A 30,000 33,000
Society B(1) 28,000 25,036 0.250
Society B(2) 25,000 22,904 0.500
Society B(3) 22,000 21,829 0.750
Working Hours (Week/Hours)
Society A 40 36
Society B(1) 42.5 46 0.250
Society B(2) 47 51 0.500
Society B(3) 61 64 0.750
Poverty Rates (%)
Society A 6.0 4.5
Society B(1) 6.7 7.3 0.250
Society B(2) 8.0 8.5 0.500
Society B(3) 9.2 9.5 0.750
Table Appendix B.2. Summary of the Experiment
Own Level of 
Consumption
Average Level of 
Others' 
Consumption
Assigned Implicit 
Degree of 
Positionality
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Appendix C.1. Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) 
 
Here indicate how closely you agree with the statement by checking one of the boxes on the 
scale between 1 to 4. 1 means strongly agree, and 4 means you strongly disagree. If your 
views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. The control/filter 
questions are marked with italics. 
 
1. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation. 
2. I prefer animals to humans. 
3. I try to keep up with the current trends and fashions. 
4. I find it difficult to explain to others things that I understand easily, when they don’t 
understand it first time. 
5. I dream most nights. 
6. I really enjoy caring for other people. 
7. I try to solve my own problems rather than strongly discussing them with others. 
8. I find it hard to know what to do in a social situation. 
9. I am at my best first thing in the morning. 
10. People often tell me that I went too far in driving my point home in a discussion. 
11. It doesn’t bother me too much if I am late meeting a friend. 
12. Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so I tend not to bother with them 
13. I would never break a law, no matter how minor. 
14. I often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite. 
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts rather than on what my listener 
might be thinking. 
16. I prefer practical jokes to verbal humor. 
17. I live life for today rather than the future. 
18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to see what would happen. 
19. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another.  
20. I tend to have very strong opinions about morality.  
21. It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much.  
22. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes.  
23. I think that good manners are the most important thing a parent can teach their child.  
24. I like to do things on the spur of the moment.  
25. I am good at predicting how someone will feel.  
26. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable.  
27. If I say something that someone else is offended by, I think that that’s their problem, 
not mine.  
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28. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would reply truthfully, even if I didn’t like 
it.  
29. I can’t always see why someone should have felt offended by a remark.  
30. People often tell me that I am very unpredictable.  
31. I enjoy being the center of attention at any social gathering.  
32. Seeing people cry doesn’t really upset me.  
33. I enjoy having discussions about politics.  
34. I am very blunt, which some people take to be rudeness, even though this is 
unintentional.  
35. I don’t tend to find social situations confusing.  
36. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what they are 
thinking.  
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their experiences rather than my own.  
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain.  
39. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people’s feelings.  
40. I can’t relax until I have done everything I had planned to do that day.  
41. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am saying.  
42. I get upset if I see people suffering on news programmes.  
43. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as they say that I am very 
understanding.  
44. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person doesn’t tell me.  
45. I often start new hobbies but quickly become bored with them and move on to something 
else.  
46. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far with teasing.  
47. I would be too nervous to go on a big rollercoaster.  
48. Other people, often say that I am insensitive, though I don’t always see why.  
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to them to make an effort to join in.  
50. I usually stay emotionally detached when watching a film.  
51. I like to be very organized in day-to-day life and often make lists of the chores I have to 
do.  
52. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively. 
53.  I don’t like to take risks.  
54. I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about.  
55. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion.  
56. Before making a decision I always weigh up the pros and cons. 
57. I don’t consciously work out the rules of social situations.  
58. I am good at predicting what someone will do.  
59. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems.  
60. I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I don’t agree with it. 
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Appendix C.2. Helping Behavior (Volunteering) 
 
Have you done any volunteer work (other than housework, unpaid) in the last 12 months? Indicate 
by checking “Yes” to the item(s) that describes best the type of your volunteer activity. Check mark 
“No” if the item is not suitable. The scale is created by summing up to answers to all questions.  
 
The type of the volunteer work 
Unpaid public work  
Cleaning, repairing and construction 
Youth organizations, youth clubs, scouting  
Activities and/or meetings of organizations 
Looking after the children and/or people of other families  
Other help to other families 
Charity organization that helps the seniors, the disabled, and the poor 
Public education activities 
Cultural and/or other public activity organizations 
Religion organizations, associations, mosque-building associations etc. 
Organizations working on environment, animal rights etc.  
Raising money for volunteer organizations 
Other volunteer activities 
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Appendix C.3. Competitivity 
 
Which type of society do you think a country should aim to be in the future? For each pair of 
statements, would you prefer being closer to the first or to the second alternative? 
An egalitarian society where the gap between 
rich and poor is small, regardless of 
achievement 
A competitive society, where wealth is 
distributed according to ones’ achievement 
 Closer to  
first 
Somewhat 
closer to 
first  
Can’t say 
which 
Somewhat 
closer to 
second 
Closer to 
second 
 
A society with extensive social  
welfare, but high taxes 
A society where taxes are low and 
individuals  
take responsibility for themselves 
 Closer to  
first 
Somewhat 
closer to 
first  
Can’t say 
which 
Somewhat 
closer to 
second 
Closer to 
second 
 
A society that assures safety and stability  
through appropriate regulations 
A deregulated society where people are  
responsible for their own actions 
 Closer to  
first 
Somewhat 
closer to 
first  
Can’t say 
which 
Somewhat 
closer to 
second 
Closer to 
second 
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Appendix D.1. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) 
 
The following statements ask about your thoughts and feelings in various situations. For 
each item indicate how well it describes you by choosing the number on the show card where 
1 indicates that it does not describe you very well and 5 means that it does describe you 
very well. Of course, numbers 2–4 indicate that how well it describes you are in between 
these points.  
 
(1) I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me 
(2) Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems  
(3) When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them 
(4) Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal  
(5) When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for 
them  
(6) I am often quite touched by things that I see happen  
(7) I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person 
 
To obtain the IRE empathy scale, we first reverse the items 2, 4, and 5, and then average 
the scores of these seven items.  
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Appendix D.2. Helping behaviors (General Social Survey, Topical Module 
on Altruism, 2002 and 2004) 
 
During the past 12 months, how often have you done each of the following things:  
 
(1) Donated blood  
(2) Given food or money to a homeless person  
(3) Returned money to a cashier after getting too much change [this question was not used 
in this study]  
(4) Allowed a stranger to go ahead of you in line  
(5) Done volunteer work for a charity  
(6) Given money to a charity  
(7) Offered your seat on a bus or in a public place to a stranger who was standing  
(8) Looked after a person’s plants, mail, or pets while they were away  
(9) Carried a stranger’s belongings, like groceries, a suitcase, or shopping bag  
(10) Given directions to a stranger  
(11) Let someone you didn’t know well borrow a item of some value like dishes or tools  
 
During the past 12 months, how often have you done any of the following things for people 
you know personally, such as relatives, friends, neighbors or other acquaintances?  
 
(12) Helped someone outside of your household with housework or shopping  
(13) Lent quite a bit of money to another person  
(14) Spent time talking with someone who was a bit down or depressed  
(15) Helped somebody to find a job 
 
 
 
 
 
